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Abstract 
The shift of employment from lower to higher productive firms is an important driver for structural 
change and industry dynamics. We investigate this reallocation in terms of employment gains and losses 
from innovation. New employment created by product innovation may be offset by employment losses in 
related products, known as ‘cannibalisation’ or ‘business stealing’ effects in the literature, by employment 
losses from process and organisational innovation and by general productivity increases. The paper 
investigates this effect empirically with a large dataset from the European Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS). We find that employment gains and losses increase with technology intensity of the sector. High-
technology manufacturing shows the strongest employment gains and losses from innovation, followed 
by knowledge-intensive services, low-technology manufacturing and less knowledge-intensive services. 
The net contribution of innovation to employment growth is mostly positive, an exception being 
manufacturing industries in recession periods. 
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1. Introduction 
The reallocation of employment and capital between firms is a major determinant of structural change and 
aggregate productivity growth, together with firm entries and exits (Caves 1998; Bartelsman and Doms 
2000; Krüger 2008; Dosi and Nelson 2010). This reallocation is largely driven by innovation and the use 
of new technologies. A famous illustration of long-term structural change as a result of major product, 
process and organisational innovations is Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942) notion of ‘creative destruction’. 
The paper aims at studying these reallocation dynamics. In particular, we ask in which sectors job gains 
and losses from innovation are highest, and to what degree and in which situations firms can compensate 
the job-destroying effects of innovation with job creation, leading to a positive overall employment effect. 
Our analysis utilises firm-level data but focuses on differences in employment dynamics at the sectoral 
and industry level. We distinguish four sector groups (high-tech manufacturing, low-tech manufacturing, 
knowledge-intensive services and less knowledge-intensive services) and investigate a more 
disaggregated level by analysing 16 industries. The sectoral and industry level is appropriate for this 
question because characteristics such as the level of technological opportunity, cumulativeness of the 
knowledge base or appropriability conditions vary considerably between sectors and industries. These 
variations in turn determine the innovation behaviour at the firm level (Marsili 2001; Cohen 2010; Dosi 
and Nelson 2010). Heterogeneity in innovation determinants may also be an important source of 
heterogeneity in innovation-induced employment creation between industries and sectors. 
We employ the model proposed by Harrison et al. (2014) that relates employment changes to product and 
process innovation at the firm level. Our study extends the work by Harrison et al. (2014) and contributes 
to the literature in four important dimensions. First, in addition to product and process innovation we 
account for organisational innovation as a third important type of innovation. Second, we construct a new 
pooled cross-sectional dataset that merges five waves from the European Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) for the period 1998-2010 whereas Harrison et al. (2014) estimate the model using data only for one 
cross section covering the years 1998–2000. The data contains more than 360,000 firm-level observations 
of the manufacturing and service sector from 26 European countries. Third, Harrison et al. (2014) only 
distinguish between manufacturing and services. We study job gains and losses from innovation at the 
sector and industry level using two different ways of classifying industries according to their technology 
intensity. This allows us to analyse the interaction between the technology intensity and the effects of 
innovation on employment. And finally, the long time period of 12 years also allows us to investigate to 
what extent sectoral displacement and compensation effects of innovation vary over the business cycle. 
Dachs et al. (2016) showed that aggregate demand conditions influence firm-level innovation outcomes 
and reallocation dynamics in manufacturing firms.   
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the relevant literature and develops hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data, while Section 4 and Section 5 discuss the econometric model and the 
estimation strategy of the paper. Section 6 follows with a discussion of the regression results. Section 7 
and Section 8 discuss the results from a decomposition analysis at the sectoral and industry level, 
respectively. Finally, Section 9 draws conclusions from the study. 
2. Literature Background and Hypotheses 
There is a well-developed research on innovation and employment (for surveys see Chennells and Van 
Reenen 2002; Vivarelli 2014) that has identified a range of employment-creating as well as employment-
destroying effects of new products, processes or organisation types. 
Most importantly, innovation in the form of new products creates additional sales for the firm and 
therefore increases employment (compensation effect of product innovation; see the surveys cited above). 
But in general, not all sales generated by new products can be characterised as pure market expansion 
effects (due to new customers or other non-substitution based sales). New products with a higher utility 
for consumers and/or a lower price may displace existing products offered by the innovating firm or by its 
competitors, so that the demand for a new product may come at the expense of demand for existing ‘old’ 
products. Hence, product innovation may incur negative externalities to the innovator itself (the 
‘cannibalisation’ effect) or to competitors (the ‘business stealing’ effect), which may reduce the initial 
employment-creating effect of product innovation. A well-known example for these adverse effects is 
from the mobile phone industry. When one of the major brands introduces a new mobile phone, sales of 
the predecessor but also of rival products usually decrease considerably. 
Cannibalisation and business stealing effects found wide recognition in the marketing literature (Chandy 
and Tellis 1998; Hauser, Tellis and Griffin 2006), but they are also discussed by the literature on R&D 
spillovers, the industrial economics literature on market entry or in endogenous models of technological 
change (Aghion and Howitt 1992). This literature shows that cannibalisation and business stealing effects 
are frequent: Lomax et al. (1997) find that some cannibalisation is almost inevitable for firms that launch 
new products, in particular for multi-product firms (Heerde, Srinivasan and Dekimpe 2010). Harrison et 
al. (2014) estimate that the reallocation due to business stealing can be up to 30% of the net employment 
effects created by new products. Exceptions may exist when a new product complements an existing 
product, or when a new product extends the product range of a firm into new fields, but benefits from the 
established brand (Lomax et al. 1997). It may also happen that new products incorporating new 
technologies do not crowd out existing ones, but that the threat of being substituted accelerate innovation 
in the old technology and as a result also stimulate demand and employment (Howells 2002, Mendonca 
2013). However, both Howells (2002) and Mendonca (2013) are rather sceptical if this so called sailing 
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ship effect is more than a product of “hindsight assumption and superficial case knowledge” (Howells 
2002, p. 902).  
Another channel how innovation can influence employment is the labour-saving displacement effect of 
process innovation (Hall, Lotti and Mairesse 2008; Harrison et al. 2014). Process innovation may reduce 
labour demand when the same output can be produced with less input. Displacement effects may also 
occur with organisational innovation or with product innovation when the new product can be produced 
with less input than the old product. Displacement effects and negative externalities are closely linked; if 
process (product) innovation allows the firm to produce the existing (new) product at a lower price than 
before, this cost difference may lead to a lower output price. This stimulates product demand on the one 
hand but also promotes cannibalisation and business stealing on the other hand. If the product offered 
becomes substantially cheaper, process innovation may also lead to overall market expansion. The 
magnitude of this effect is determined by the size of the price reduction, the elasticity of demand and the 
reactions of competitors to the price reduction. Empirical evidence for this price effect is provided by 
König, Licht and Buscher (1995), Greenan and Guellec (2000), Smolny (2002) or Lachenmaier and 
Rottmann (2011) who all find significantly positive overall employment effects of process innovations. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the combined effect of positive compensation effects and negative 
externalities due to cannibalisation and displacement effects is positive, resulting in employment growth 
at the firm level (Hall, Lotti and Mairesse 2008; Lachenmaier and Rottmann 2011; Harrison et al. 2014) 
and also at the industry level when taking additional negative externalities due to business stealing into 
account (Bogliacino and Pianta 2010). Moreover, negative externalities from business stealing are 
considerably smaller than the positive spillovers from R&D activity, leading to positive gross social 
returns to R&D (Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen 2013). Most of these studies investigate 
employment effects of innovation in the short or medium run and little is known about compensation and 
displacement effects of innovation in the long run. 
There are, however, a number of factors at the level of individual industries and firms that presumably 
lead to a considerable degree of heterogeneity in the effects of innovation below the aggregate level. 
Industries differ in a number of technology-related factors including the richness of technological 
opportunities, the cumulativeness of the knowledge base, or the means to protect and appropriate the 
economic benefits from innovation (Marsili 2001; Cohen 2010; Dosi and Nelson 2010). We can observe 
the results of these factors in persistent differences in the prevailing technological trajectories between 
sectors and distinct technological regimes that shape the directions of technological search in industries 
(Breschi, Malerba and Orsenigo 2000; Marsili 2001; Castellacci 2007). 
In addition to technology-related factors, the strength of compensation and displacement effects as well as 
of negative externalities of product and process innovation also depends on a number of non-technology 
factors. User requirements and other demand side characteristics have a crucial role in determining the 
4 
  
success or failure of innovations. Demand can also influence the intensity and direction of technological 
search by firms when differences in demand expectations between sectors translate into different 
incentives to invest in R&D and innovation (Schmookler 1966; Acemoglu 2002). In addition, the 
elasticity of demand, the competitive pressure in an industry or the reaction time of competitors are other 
important determinants of the strength and duration of compensation and displacement effects though 
little is known in the literature about the duration of these effects.  
Technology-related and non-technology factors shape the aforementioned compensation and 
displacement effects of innovation in a co-evolutionary way. For the sake of simplicity, our basic 
hypothesis is that firms in an industry characterised by large technological opportunities and fast, 
disruptive technological change may experience stronger compensation, but also stronger displacement 
effects from product and process innovation than firms in industries with slow technological change. This 
is because the high pace of technological change in some industries allows firms to develop and introduce 
products more frequently, with more new features and a quickly decreasing price/performance ratio. 
Moreover, industries that have a higher technology intensity also include a higher share of firms with 
radical innovations which are related with stronger cannibalisation effects (Chandy and Tellis 1998; 
Heerde, Srinivasan and Dekimpe 2010). We therefore derive the following hypothesis: 
H1: Compensation and displacement effects increase with technology intensity of the sector and industry. 
The analysis of this paper also covers service industries, which allows us to analyse additional 
heterogeneity. Macroeconomic data on average reveal a higher employment growth in services than in 
manufacturing across European countries (Veugelers 2013). This has been explained by a higher income 
elasticity of service products compared to manufacturing products and a higher degree of tradability of 
manufacturing products allowing a stronger shift of manufacturing towards lower-cost countries (Baumol 
2012; Veugelers 2013). 
There is a long discussion how innovation in service firms differs from innovation in manufacturing 
firms, and if service and manufacturing innovation can be measured by the same metrics (Tether 2005; 
Gallouj and Savona 2009). From this literature we know that innovation in services is more often non-
technological, is based to a lesser degree on the application of scientific and formal knowledge, includes 
more interaction with clients, requires more of the necessary social skills for interaction, and can be 
protected less efficiently with formal intellectual property rights than innovation in manufacturing. 
Moreover, service products are more often the result of user-producer interaction and customisation than 
standardised manufacturing products (Tether, Hipp and Miles 2001; Miles 2005).  
If we consider customised products resulting from user-producer innovation as variants of the old 
standard product and accept a slower pace of technological change in service sectors, we may assume that 
old products - relative to new products - contribute more to overall employment growth in services than in 
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manufacturing. This would imply that less negative externalities, but also less employment creation from 
innovation: 
H2: Compensation and displacement effects are smaller in services than in manufacturing. 
3. Sample and Data Description 
In order to investigate reallocation effects of employment due to innovation and to test our two 
hypotheses, we make use of the European-wide harmonised Community Innovation Surveys (CIS). CIS is 
a firm-level survey that is based on the Oslo Manual (latest edition: OECD and Eurostat 2005). The paper 
employs five waves of CIS data covering the years 1998-2000 (CIS3), 2002-2004 (CIS4), 2004-2006 
(CIS2006), 2006-2008 (CIS2008) and 2008-2010 (CIS2010). The merged dataset comprises information 
from 26 European countries1 of which 12 are present in each wave. The non-anonymised micro data were 
accessed at Eurostat’s safecenter. In total, the merged CIS dataset contains 414,474 observations for the 
five periods. However, due to missing values, in particular for organisational innovation in CIS20062, we 
end up with a sample of 361,865 observations. 56% of all observations are manufacturing firms whereas 
the other 44% are service firms (see Table 1 below).  
CIS is a representative survey for manufacturing sector and for selected service industries. To further 
disaggregate the data, we employ two different sectoral classifications. First, we define 19 industries 
based on NACE3 2-digit industries. Table 7 in the Annex provides the definition of the industries and 
their sample distribution. Manufacturing of basic and fabricated metals, food and beverages as well as the 
textile industry are the largest sectors within manufacturing, each accounting for about 14% of the 
sample. The largest service sector is wholesale, with a share of 34%. Subsequently, transport, technical 
services and telecommunication/information technology have shares ranging from approximately 21% to 
10% of all service firms. Second, we split sectors according to their technology intensity into four broad 
sectors. Following Eurostat (2016a,b), we define high-technology manufacturing (HIGH), low-
technology manufacturing (LOW), knowledge-intensive services (KIS) and less knowledge-intensive 
services (LKIS). Table 8 in the Annex presents details of this aggregation.  
                                                     
1  Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
2   The question on organisational innovation was not mandatory in CIS2006 and it was only asked by 4 out of the 15 countries available at 
Eurostat. Dachs et al. (2016) checked carefully the robustness of results including and excluding organisational innovation for the aggregate 
sample. 
3   Note that CIS3, CIS4 and CIS2006 use the NACE Rev. 1.1 classification while CIS2008 and CIS2010 employ NACE Rev. 2. A concordance 
has been used to have a unified classification for the whole period and to define 11 and 8 industries in manufacturing and services, 
respectively.  
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Table 1: Sample size and share of manufacturing and services for five waves of the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) 
CIS Period Total Manufacturing Services 
  
 
N % Cum N % N % 
CIS 3 1998-2000 65,729 18.16 18.16 42,378 20.76 23,351 14.80 
CIS 4 2002-2004 76,395 21.11 39.28 43,450 21.29 32,945 20.88 
CIS2006 2004-2006 23,253 6.43 45.70 13,116 6.43 10,137 6.43 
CIS2008 2006-2008 94,480 26.11 71.81 52,029 25.49 42,451 26.91 
CIS2010 2008-2010 102,008 28.19 100.00 53,140 26.03 48,868 30.98 
Pooled 1998-2010 361,865 100   204,113 100.0 157,752 100.0 
Source: CIS3, CIS4, CIS2006, CIS2008 and CIS2010, Eurostat; own calculation. 
Furthermore, in order to investigate whether reallocation effects of innovation are robust to different 
phases of the business cycle, we follow Lucchese and Pianta (2012) and Dachs et al. (2016) and 
additionally split the sample into four business cycle periods: upturn, boom, downturn and recession. The 
business cycle phases are defined based on the country-specific two-year GDP growth rates using GDP 
data published by Eurostat. The GDP growth is defined over a two-year period because each CIS wave 
covers a three-year reference period. An upturn is defined as a period with positive and increasing GDP 
growth. A boom is the last period of positive and increasing GDP growth before a downturn starts. In 
downturns GDP growth is positive but decreasing, whereas a recession is characterised by negative GDP 
growth. 
In addition to a broad range of innovation indicators, the CIS contains general firm information as well. 
The central non-innovation variables for the analysis are employment and sales growth at the firm level. 
Each CIS wave contains information about employment and sales in a given year t and in year t-2, thus 
allowing us to calculate employment and sales growth at the firm level. 
The CIS measures employment by the average total number (headcount) of employees of a firm in a 
certain year.4 Unfortunately, the CIS does not provide any information on hours worked or on the total 
wage bill which we would have preferred. We calculate employment growth as the percent change of the 
headcount employment of the firm from year t-2 to year t (EMP). As we consider employment growth 
and innovation for the same period, the paper estimates the employment effects of innovation within a 
(maximum of) three-year period. Presumably, this is not enough to assess the entire employment effects. 
While it is likely that displacement effects of innovations are realised closer to the time of their 
introduction, positive compensation effects of product innovations may stimulate demand and 
                                                     
4  The core CIS questionnaire does not further specify the term employment. Even though not explicitly stated in the questionnaire, the term 
total employees in headcounts implies that part-time workers should be included. On the contrary, agency workers should not be counted 
because they are employees of the temporary employment agencies. Total employment of course also includes R&D personnel. Countries are 
also allowed using administrative data for employment instead of asking firms within the CIS.  
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employment also in the long-run. Compensation effects of process and organisational innovations may 
also only appear with a certain delay after the firm has realised cost reductions and decided to pass them 
on to consumers. Estimating long-run effects would require a panel data analysis that is not feasible with 
the data at hand.5 Hence, our results should be interpreted as lower bounds of innovation-induced 
employment effects.  
Figure 1 depicts employment growth over the business cycle for high-tech and low-tech manufacturing, 
knowledge-intensive services and less knowledge-intensive services. Employment growth is calculated as 
the weighted average two-year employment growth rates across all firms in a given sector group. Hence, 
it cannot be directly compared with growth rates based on official employment statistics which are 
calculated by taking the ratio of the sum of changes in employment for all firms to the sum of employed 
personnel. Due to the different calculation method, average employment growth rates are stronger 
affected by very fast growing firms.6 Another source of deviation stems from that CIS data cannot 
account for employment losses from firm closures, because these firms do not enter the data. The same 
holds for employment in very small firms with less than 10 employees, which includes a number of start-
ups. 
In both groups of manufacturing firms, the same pro-cyclical movement of average employment growth 
appears. Both groups exhibit a clear negative employment growth in the recession phases, whereas the 
highest growth can be observed in the boom and upturn phases of the business cycle. The knowledge-
intensive service sector also shows a pro-cyclical employment growth, but has much higher growth rates 
than manufacturing and no decrease during recession periods which is consistent with LFS figures. An 
exemption from a strictly pro-cyclical development of employment growth rates can be found in less 
knowledge-intensive services where the growth rates have been highest during the upturns.  
For all business cycle periods employment gains are larger in knowledge-intensive services than in less 
knowledge-intensive services. This could be a first indication of hypothesis H1. Likewise, average 
employment growth in high-tech manufacturing firms exceeds that in low-tech manufacturing firms 
during boom and downturn periods. Employment losses during recessions, in contrast, are smaller in 
high-tech than in low-tech manufacturing, which would contradict H1. Total employment gains and 
                                                     
5   See the more detailed explanation at the end of this section. 
6   While the average employment growth is 10.3% in KIS and 7.6% in LKIS in our sample, the median employment growth is much lower with 
4.5% and 0.0%. The same pattern is found for both manufacturing groups (HIGH: 3.8% and 0.0%; LOW: 3.0% and 0.0%). Due to the 
different calculation method, it might even be that we simultaneously observe an overall contraction of employment in a certain sector and a 
positive average employment growth at the firm level in this sector if employment e.g. strongly decreases (increases) in larger (smaller) 
firms. For comparison, we therefore calculated the average two-year employment growth rate for the period 2000-2010 based on the EU 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) statistics (here average means over the period 2000-2010). Employment growth based on LFS statistics is 
similarly high for KIS (8.7%), but substantially lower for LKIS (1.3 %). As for CIS data, LFS statistics show lower employment growth for 
both manufacturing groups (HIGH: -2.9%; LOW: -1.4%).  
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losses in Figure 1, however, are the sum of compensation and displacement effects which have to be split 
up into its single effects. 
Figure 1: Employment growth by sector groups and business cycle, 1998-2010 
 
Notes: Depicted are weighted average two-year employment growth rates across all firms in a given sector and 
business cycle phase. Weighting factors are sample weights that extrapolate to the population number of firms in 
each stratum. Sample weights are based on the (non-response corrected) inverse drawing probabilities in each 
stratum and are provided by Eurostat.  
Source: CIS3, CIS4, CIS2006, CIS2008 and CIS2010, Eurostat; own calculation. 
The main independent variables used in the empirical analysis are different measures of innovation from 
the CIS, which are based on the Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat 2005). Product innovation is captured 
in the CIS by the question if the firm has introduced any new or considerably improved product to the 
market during the last three years (t, t-1 and t-2), regardless of whether the product was new to the market 
or just new to the firm. The product (good or service) should be new or significantly improved with 
respect to its capabilities, user friendliness, components or sub-systems. Another key variable that we will 
exploit in the econometric analysis is the share of sales in year t with product innovations introduced in t, 
t-1 and t-2. We use this information to generate the sales growth rate between t and t-2 that stems from 
new products (SGR_NEWPD)7. The sales growth due to new products is used in the econometric model 
as a quantitative indicator for the level of product innovation in the firm. 
Process innovation (PC), in contrast, is measured by a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the 
firm has introduced at least one new or significantly improved production process, distribution method, or 
                                                     
7    The sales growth rate between t and t-2 that stems from new products (SGR_NEWPD) is calculated as share of sales in year t with new 
products which have been introduced between t and t-2 times the ratio of year t’s sales divided by the sales of t-2. 
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supporting activity for internal processes. We measure organisational innovation (ORGA) by a dummy 
variable that takes on the value one if the firm has implemented at least one of the following types of 
organisational innovations: (i) new business practices for organising procedures (e.g. supply chain 
management, business re-engineering, lean production), (ii) new methods of organising work 
responsibilities and decision making (e.g. team work, decentralisation, delayering) and (iii) new methods 
of organising external relations with other firms or public institutions (e.g. partnerships, alliances, in- and 
outsourcing). Both, the process and the organisational innovation variables take on the value zero if there 
is no such innovation. The next section describes the econometric model that we use in order to identify 
compensation and displacement effects of these three types of innovation.  
4. Econometric Model, Empirical Implementation, Identification and 
Estimation 
In order to investigate employment effects of innovation, we adopt the multi-product approach developed 
by Harrison et al. (2008, 2014). The original model establishes a relationship between employment 
growth and sales growth due to new products and, process innovation. As already mentioned our analysis 
will extend the study and results by Harrison et al. in four important dimensions: (i) we additionally 
account for organisational innovation; (ii) we focus on compensation and displacement effects of 
innovation at the sectoral and industry level; (iii) we make use of a pooled cross-sectional dataset 
covering the period 1998-2010 that (iv) allows us to study whether sectoral employment effects of 
innovation varies over the business cycle or not. We shortly describe the main features of the model 
below. For a more detailed description we refer to Harrison et al. (2014).  
4.1 Econometric Model 
Consider a firm that produces a set of products in a specific point of time t=1. These products are 
labelled old (existing) products. Between t=1 and t=2, a second point of time, the firm can decide to 
introduce a new set of products. Due to the definition of innovation in CIS data, this reference period 
between t=1 and t=2 covers a three-year period in the empirical analysis. The model is fully flexible 
whether the new product substitutes the old product (which captures the cannibalisation effect) or 
whether it enhances the demand of the old product in case of complementarity. Firm i’s output of the 
old product at time t=1,2, 1tiY , is produced according to the production functions 
( )11 11 11 11* , ii i i iY F L X eηθ=  and ( )12 12 12 12* , i iui i i iY F L X eηθ −= , where 1tθ is an efficiency parameter in 
the production of the old product at time t, 1tL  measures the labour input and 1tX summarises other 
variable inputs like capital and material. iη  captures time-constant firm-specific unobserved 
productivity shocks whereas iu accounts for unanticipated productivity shocks. Furthermore, output of 
10 
  
the new product at time t=2, 22iY , is generated by ( )22 22 22 22* , i ivi i i iY F L X eηθ −= , where 22 22 22, ,L Xθ and 
iη  are defined accordingly for the new product and iv accounts for unanticipated productivity shocks 
in the production of the new product. Harrison et al. (2014) show that under these fairly general 
assumptions employment growth l , defined as ( )12 22 11 11/L L L L+ − , can be written as: 
1 2l y y uα β= + + + . Employment growth 𝑙 originates from the growth of real output of old products, 
1y , and the growth in real output that is due to new products, 2y .
8 Furthermore, it stems from 
efficiency changes in the production of old products, α , which we assume are the sum of efficiency 
gains due to process innovation ( )1 pcα ⋅ , organisational innovation ( )2 orgaα ⋅  and efficiency 
improvements unrelated to the firm’s own innovation activities, e.g. as a result of learning effects, 
spillovers, inputs of higher quality, selling or shutting down of unprofitable business units or mergers 
and acquisitions. This leads to the following relationship between employment growth 𝑙 and the 
independent variables: 
(1)     0 1 2 1 2l pc orga y y uα α α β= + + + + +  
Note that firm-fixed effects have been cancelled out in the growth formulation. 
In the model β measures the relative efficiency of new products relative to existing products 
( )11 22/θ θ  and 2yβ measures the average compensation effect (direct demand effect) of product 
innovation. Ceteris paribus, new products will generate less employment growth if their production is 
more efficient than the production technology of the old products. In contrast, 1α  and 2α  measure the 
mean displacement effects of process and organisational innovations. Note that the change in the 
output production of old products 1y  may be provoked by autonomous demand changes due to changes 
in consumer preferences but more importantly also by the firm’s own new product, the induced change 
being negative for substitutes (cannibalisation effect) and positive for complements. But it also 
accounts for demand shifts for old products due to new products introduced by rivals (business 
stealing) and price reductions following own process innovations (compensation effects of process 
innovation). Unfortunately, only the existence of additional demand data would allow us to 
disentangle the different externality effects (cannibalisation and business stealing of product 
innovation and compensation effect of process innovation) captured by 1y . In the model, the 
coefficient of the real output growth, 1y , is equal to one and can thus be subtracted from 𝑙. 
                                                     
8   Note: Since new products have not been produced in t=1, we cannot measure the real output growth of new products. Instead, 
2
y is defined 
as ( )2 22 11 22 11/ /vy Y Y Y e Y= = which is the output of the new product (excluding unanticipated productivity shocks) at t=2 to the output of the 
old product at t=1 and therefore captures the real output growth rate due to new products. 
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4.2 Empirical Implementation 
Unfortunately, we cannot directly estimate equation (1) since we cannot observe real output growth 
rates in our data. Instead, we replace the unobserved growth rates by the observable nominal output 
growth rates measured as sales growth. This yields the following estimation equation (2): 
(2)    ( )1 1 0 1 2 2l g pc orga gp α α α β ε− − = + + + +  
In our data l  is measured by the variable EMP, i.e. the employment growth rate (in headcounts) 
between t and t-2. pc  is measured by the variable PC, a binary indicator that equals one if the firms 
has introduced at least one process innovation but no product innovation. This stricter definition of PC 
allows us to unambiguously identify the displacement effects associated with the introduction of 
process innovations in the production of old products and not to mix it up with process innovations 
necessary to introduce new products. orga is measured by the dummy variable ORGA that equals one 
if the firm has introduced at least one organisational innovation. The nominal sales growth of the old 
products, 1g , and the sales growth due to the new products, 2g , are defined as 1 1 1g y p= +  and 
( )2 2 21g yp= + . Both variables can be calculated from CIS data. 2g  is measured by the variable 
SGR_NEWPD which we derived as the share of sales due to new products in t times the ratio of sales 
in t and t-2. 1g is calculated as the total sales growth rate (the change of turnover between t and 𝑡 − 2), 
g , minus 2g .  
1p measures the unobserved price growth rate of old products at the firm level. We proxy 1p  by the 
price growth rate of old products at the country-industry (2-digit) level, 1p  (using producer price 
indices published by Eurostat). Subtracting the proxy for the real output growth of old products, 
( )1 1g p−  , from employment growth, 𝑙, allows us to unambiguously estimate the gross effect of 
process, organisational and product innovations.  
4.3 Identification and Estimation Strategy 
2p  is defined as the price difference between new products at t and old products at t-2 in relation to the 
price of the old products at t-2 at the firm level. The problem is that this price information cannot be 
observed, not even at a sector level. However, substituting a real rate of change by a nominal rate of 
change requires price growth information to adequately estimate the effect. As a result, the estimation of 
β  suffers from an endogeneity problem caused by measurement errors. This can be seen from the fact 
that ( )2 2 21g yp= +  is by definition correlated with the new composite error term 
( )
1 1 2 2
E y uε p p βp= − − − + . β  as well as the 'sα  would also be biased if the innovation variables 
,pc orga  and 2g  were correlated with the unobserved productivity shock u  at t=2. However, this is 
12 
  
rather unlikely to be the case as the innovation decision has most likely be taken before t=2 when u  is 
unknown to the firm (see Harrison et al. 2014).  
To solve the endogeneity problem of the relative productivity effect β caused by measurement error, we 
employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach to estimate equation (2). The instrument should be 
correlated with the product innovation success (sales growth rate due to new products) but uncorrelated to 
relative price differences between new and old new products. We follow Harrison et al. (2014) and use as 
first instrument RANGE, a binary indicator that measures whether the product innovations were aimed at 
increasing the product range or not. The idea is that a broadening of the product range addresses new 
customer bases and generates higher new product sales. Enlarging the range of products, however, does 
not imply any particular direction of the changes in the price of the new relative to the old product as they 
can be sold at higher or lower prices than existing products. As two other potential instruments, we 
employ binary indicators taking on the value one if the firm continuously conducts R&D activities (RD), 
and if the firm has cooperated in innovation projects with other agents like suppliers, research institutions 
and competitors (COOP), respectively. The reasoning for using COOP as instrument is based on the idea 
that firms benefit from knowledge spillovers due to cooperation. We expect these spillovers to increase 
the propensity to successfully develop new products which should in turn lead to higher expected new 
product sales. Furthermore, cooperating firms may benefit from their partners’ distribution channels 
which might also be correlated with higher expected sales with new products. However, we do not expect 
this to significantly affect the relative price between old and new products. Some cooperation activities, 
e.g. related to the development of radical innovations, might indeed lead to higher prices while other 
cooperation activities, e.g. with suppliers, might be associated with lowering costs and prices of new 
products. Firms that continuously invest in R&D (RD) should likewise have a higher likelihood of 
inventing new technologies and as a result higher expected sales with new products. However, it is not 
necessarily the case that firms with continuous R&D systematically charge higher prices for their new 
products than firms that discontinuously conduct R&D or innovate without any R&D activities.  
The consistency of our IV estimates depends on the validity of instruments, i.e. the assumption that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. Therefore, we performed a Hansen J test on 
overidentifying restrictions for overall instrument validity and we used the difference-in-Hansen C 
statistic to test for exogeneity of a single instrument. It turned out that in high- and low-tech 
manufacturing RANGE and COOP are the only valid instruments for the total period and for all business 
cycle phases. For services, we likewise find RANGE and COOP to be valid instruments in KIS and LKIS 
for the overall period. However, when we split the sample by business cycle phases, only RD and COOP 
passed the C test on instrument exogeneity.  
We also checked for non-weakness of the instruments. Weak instruments can lead to a large relative 
finite-sample bias of IV compared to the bias of OLS (in case of endogenous explanatory variables). All 
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first stage regressions show our valid instruments to be strongly correlated with the sales growth due to 
new products. Furthermore, the F-test of joint significance of the excluded instruments always yields a 
statistic clearly being larger than 10. The regression output tables additionally display the Kleibergen-
Paap LM test statistic on underidentification as well as the Kleibergen and Paap F test statistic on weak 
instruments (Kleibergen and Paap 2006).  All these tests do not indicate our instruments to be weak. 
As we are interested in studying reallocation dynamics, that is displacement and compensation effects of 
innovation at the sectoral level, we estimate equation (2) separately for the four sector groups and 16 
industries. Furthermore, in order to investigate to what extent reallocation effects of innovation vary over 
the business cycle, we additionally split the sample into four business cycle periods: upturn, boom, 
downturn and recession (see Section 3). 
A drawback of the created panel dataset is that individual firms cannot be tracked over time. This is not 
because CIS is simply a pooled cross sectional dataset consisting of random samples of different firms in 
different time periods. A considerable proportion of firms is repeatedly observed in the dataset due to 
three reasons. First, two countries (BG, MT) carry out the CIS as a census of all firms with 10 and more 
employees (target population). Second, in all other countries the CIS is at least a combination of a census 
of large firms and random sampling among small firms. The size threshold above which all firms are 
covered ranges from 50 employees (BE, EE, SI, IS, NO, HR) to 500 employees (DE) and is 250 
employees for the majority of countries. Third, in some countries like Germany or Spain the random 
samples are also designed as a panel. Despite the fact that a considerable proportion of firms is repeatedly 
included in the dataset, we cannot exploit this information due to missing firm identifiers at Eurostat 
safecenter. As a result, we are not able to account for firm fixed effects in the empirical analysis but only 
employ pooled IV estimators assuming i.i.d. error terms. Given the fact that some firms are repeatedly 
observed, the i.i.d. assumption may be violated. We will address this in the following empirical analysis 
by using clustered standard errors at the industry-country level and hence allowing for correlation among 
the errors terms in the cluster. 
5. Regression Results 
Using equation (2), Table 2 reports regression results on the association between innovation and 
employment growth for four sector groups – HIGH, LOW, KIS and LKIS. Table 3 and Table 4 display 
the results for equation (2) when we additionally account for different phases of the business cycle – 
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Table 3 for HIGH and LOW and Table 4 for KIS and LKIS. Table 9 in the Appendix finally presents 
results at the more disaggregated industry level.9 
Recall, the dependent variable is ( )1 1l g p− −   where l, g1 and 1p  are defined as employment growth, sales 
growth due to old products and price growth for old products where all growth rates are defined between t 
and t-2. In addition to the central explanatory variables from equation (2), i.e. binary indicators for 
process innovation (PC) and organisational innovation (ORGA) as well as sales growth rate due to new 
products between t and t-2, 2g , (SGR_NEWPD), we add a number of control variables. The regression 
controls for foreign ownership captured by the two dummy variables DGP for domestic group firms and 
FGP for foreign-owned firms (reference group: domestic single firms). In order to control for differences 
in initial firm size in year t-2, two dummy variables are included: MEDIUM indicates firms with 50-249 
employees and LARGE captures firms with 250+ employees. The reference group consists of small firms 
with 10-49 employees. Furthermore, country-specific two-year GDP growth rate (GDPGR), country 
dummies and time dummies as well as industry dummies for sector level regressions are included as 
controls. Information on foreign ownership and firm size is taken from the CIS. We include firm size 
because of the long-standing debate in economics if firm growth is dependent or independent of firm size 
(Sutton 1997). In the case of foreign ownership, Dachs and Peters (2014) recently showed that 
employment grows slower and is also more volatile in foreign-owned firms. GDP growth is included to 
reflect demand conditions in a particular country. Even if countries are in the same stage of the business 
cycle, they can differ in the growth rate of demand. 
The coefficient of the sales growth rate due to new products, SGR_NEWPD, represents the gross effect of 
product innovation on employment. A value of one for the coefficient of SGR_NEWPD indicates that an 
increase in sales by one percent due to new products increases gross employment by one percent. A value 
for SGR_NEWPD of less than one implies that new products are produced with higher efficiency and thus 
less labour input than old products. Results reveal that this coefficient is significant and positive in all 
four sectors, in all four stages of the business cycle and in all 16 industries. This is a very strong 
indication for a positive relationship between employment and innovation and confirms previous results 
at the aggregate level also for the sector and industry level. However, a test if the coefficient for 
SGR_NEWPD is different from one yields no significant result in most cases (56 out of 64 samples). Only 
in less knowledge-intensive services we find new products to be produced with significantly higher 
efficiency and thus less labour input than old products. This result is largely driven by wholesale firms. 
We may therefore assume that the coefficient of SGR_NEWPD at industry and sector level as well as in 
different stages of the business cycle is mostly one or close to one. A number of arguments from the 
                                                     
9   We report results for 16 2-digit industries. We left out consultancies, other business related services and media due to insufficient number of 
observations. This is due to the fact that they do not belong to the core CIS industries (in all waves) and hence are not provided by all 
countries.  
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literature presented in Section 2 would suggest a much greater heterogeneity in this coefficient with 
respect to the sectoral technology intensity.10  
Overall, the regression results provide only little evidence for negative displacement effects of process 
innovation at the sector level. The strongest evidence is found for low-tech manufacturing where process 
innovation has a significantly negative coefficient for the whole period 1998-2010 and it turns out to be 
negative in all four business cycles though it is only significant in upturn and downturn phases (see Table 
3). The results of Table 2 indicate that process innovators in low-tech manufacturing experience 
additional average efficiency gains of roughly 1.2% in two years, i.e. about 0.6% p.a. For high-tech 
manufacturing we also find negative displacement effects of similar magnitude but which are only 
significant in upturn periods. Displacement effects of process innovation are even less relevant in 
knowledge-intensive services and in less knowledge-intensive services where we could not find any 
significant effect, neither overall nor in different phases of the business cycle. This might be because 
firms may find it harder to identify process innovation in services as clear production processes are often 
not defined. Another reason could be that price level information at industry level is of lower quality in 
services than in manufacturing so that part of the price effect is captured by the process innovation and 
not by the industry price level. But finally it should also kept in mind that process innovation might not 
necessarily be introduced to reduce costs and labour but also to fulfil legal requirements or to increase 
product quality. The industry level results presented in Table 9 show that this pattern is very consistent 
across industries in these sector groups, with the exception of technical services.  
 
                                                     
10   We additionally test for the equality of the coefficients of SGR_NEWPD across samples in Table 2. For instance, the significance of the 
difference between the coefficients Hβ and Lβ in high- and low-tech manufacturing samples can be assessed with the statistic: 
( ) 1 22 2ˆ ˆˆ ˆ /
H LH L
z s s
β β
β β= − +   (see Clogg, Petkova and Haritou, 1995). Applying this to all sector combinations in Table 2, we do not 
find significant differences between the effect of SGR_NEWPD across sectors. 
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Table 2: Impact of innovation on employment growth by sector groups 
 
HIGH LOW KIS LKIS 
SGR_NEWPD 0.999*** 0.977*** 0.969*** 0.935*** 
 
(0.038) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030) 
PC -1.026 -1.179** -0.303 -0.909 
 
(0.693) (0.599) (1.474) (0.826) 
ORGA -1.454** -2.075*** -0.989 -0.425 
 
(0.701) (0.488) (0.768) (0.5.79) 
MEDIUM -2.365*** -1.291*** -4.028*** -3.361*** 
 
(0.862) (0.340) (0.837) (0.458) 
LARGE -4.256*** -2.982*** -5.181*** -4.375*** 
 
(0.978) (0.528) (1.036) (0.680) 
DGP 1.393* 1.100* -0.275 0.445 
 
(0.765) (0.640) (0.708) (0.645) 
FGP 0.394 -0.126 -0.929 -1.701** 
 
(0.823) (0.554) (0.932) (0.834) 
Constant -22.334*** -21.032*** -16.986*** -8.912*** 
 
(2.238) (1.547) (4.455) (2.109) 
Wald test on joint significance     
Industry 0.026** 0.000*** 0.054* 0.000*** 
Country 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Time 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
R2a 0.475 0.343 0.337 0.225 
RMSE 27.401 27.846 34.021 31.997 
Wald-Test: β=1 0.986 0.212 0.318 0.031** 
Tests on Exogeneity (p-value)     
SGR_NEWPD 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.015** 
Tests on Instrument validity (p-value)     
Sargan/Hansen J 0.132 0.378 0.782 0.080* 
First stage results     
RANGE 24.239*** 22.501*** 22.769*** 23.602*** 
 
(1.023) (0.570) ( 1.028) (0.761) 
COOP 6.595*** 6.045*** 12.111*** 5.807*** 
 
(1.036) (0.600) (0.760) (0.880) 
F test  on excluded instruments 408.11*** 782.72*** 490.69*** 692.00*** 
Partial R2 0.1868 0.1898 0.1671 0.2071 
Tests on underidentification     
Kleibergen-Paap LM test 247.834*** 710.633*** 334.917*** 1028.579*** 
Test on weak instruments     
Kleibergen-Paap F test  741.552*** 1772.661*** 1110.652*** 692.002*** 
Weak instruments robust inference     
Anderson-R. Wald test 313.600*** 1265.649*** 573.485*** 609.825*** 
Stock-Wright LM test 25.959*** 72.303*** 49.495*** 529.340*** 
Obs 51,632 150,147 66,002 88,925 
Notes: Method: Weighted IV estimation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors are 
clustered by industry (2-digit NACE level) and country. Industry, country and time dummies are included in each regression. 
Instruments for sales growth due to new products (SGR_NEWPD): RANGE and COOP. First stage statistics: Reported are only 
coefficients and standard errors of the instruments, results for the other exogenous variables in the first stage are available upon 
request. F reports the test statistic of an F-Test on the joint significance of the excluded instruments in the first stage. The 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic tests the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified, i.e. that the matrix of reduced form 
coefficients is not of full rank. Weak instruments can lead to a large relative bias of IV compared to the bias of OLS. The 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak, more precisely that the maximal IV size is 
larger than p%. Here, p is chosen to be 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25%. The Kleibergen and Paap F statistic is robust to 
heteroskedasticity. For K=1 endogenous regressor and L=2 instruments the critical values are 19.93 (p=10%,***), 11.59 
(p=15%, **), 8.75 (p=20%, *) and 7.25 (p=25%, #); see Stock and Yogo (2005) and Baum et al. (2007).  
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Table 3: Impact of innovation on employment growth over the business cycle in high- and low-tech 
manufacturing 
 High-tech manufacturing Low-tech manufacturing 
 
Upturn Boom Downturn Recession Upturn Boom Downturn Recession 
SGR_NEWP
D 0.995*** 0.964*** 1.021*** 0.993*** 0.972*** 0.970*** 0.997*** 0.955*** 
 
(0.034) (0.056) (0.055) (0.058) (0.027) (0.040) (0.027) (0.023) 
PC -2.813* 1.522 -1.408 0.568 -1.613* -0.573 -1.921* -0.634 
 
(1.559) (2.121) (1.649) (2.478) (0.930) (1.382) (1.060) (1.100) 
ORGA -2.187** -0.430 -0.661 0.390 -2.131*** 1.007 -1.553** -0.822** 
 
(1.002) (1.684) (0.753) (1.294) (0.639) (0.930) (0.743) (0.413) 
GDPGR 2.351** -0.160 -0.171 0.173 3.849*** 3.533** -0.722*** -0.045 
 
(0.979) (0.406) (0.248) (0.523) (0.117) (1.689) (0.200) (0.314) 
MEDIUM -3.908*** 1.022 -2.283 -3.285*** -2.836*** -0.398 -1.037 -1.721*** 
 
(1.007) (2.161) (1.466) (0.762) (0.468) (0.884) (0.639) (0.561) 
LARGE -5.639*** -2.986 -2.671 -5.526*** -4.247*** -3.813*** -1.079 -3.490*** 
 
(1.018) (2.407) (1.802) (1.061) (0.637) (1.139) (0.883) (0.762) 
DGP -1.838** 4.824*** -0.386 3.543*** -1.243 2.559** 0.836 0.340 
 
(0.919) (1.623) (1.711) (1.134) (0.828) (1.163) (0.707) (0.640) 
FGP -0.007 2.216 -0.448 -1.152 -1.736 0.474 0.550 -2.007** 
 
(1.275) (1.716) (1.306) (0.949) (1.077) (1.261) (0.836) (0.817) 
Constant -53.550*** -9.650** -20.328*** -0.632 -69.290*** -39.935*** -14.044*** 3.554* 
 
(12.328) (4.889) (4.045) (2.673) (2.005) (15.156) (3.063) (1.875) 
Wald test on joint significance 
Industry 0.000*** 0.538 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Country 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Time 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.001*** - 0.000*** - 0.000*** - 
R2a 0.436 0.534 0.458 0.582 0.359 0.466 0.369 0.406 
RMSE 29.759 25.048 28.290 21.308 29.740 23.027 29.002 20.890 
Wald-Test: 
β=1 0.892 0.527 0.709 0.908 0.293 0.446 0.914 0.054* 
Tests on Exogeneity (p-value) 
SGR_NEWP
D 0.005*** 0.330 0.015** 0.111 0.000*** 0.011** 0.000*** 0.058* 
Tests on Instrument validity (p-value) 
Sargan/ 
Hansen J 0.216 0.157 0.613 0.325 0.511 0.555 0.166 0.693 
First stage results 
RANGE 25.821*** 24.914*** 22.689*** 20.919*** 23.436*** 21.675*** 24.034*** 20.446*** 
 
(1.564) (1.574) ( 1.218) (2.200) (0.856) (1.031) (1.047) (1.037) 
COOP 6.780*** 8.281*** 7.694*** 5.359*** 7.226*** 5.244*** 6.643*** 3.324*** 
 
(1.478) (2.763) (0.932) (1.619) ('1.052) (1.956) (0.883) (0.881) 
F test on 
excluded instr. 218.00*** 177.45*** 373.32*** 114.21*** 589.95*** 231.98*** 290.3*** 282.51*** 
Partial R2 0.1931 0.2093 0.1992 0.1592 0.1751 0.1854 0.1987 0.2122 
Tests on underidentification 
Kleibergen-
Paap LM test 105.51*** 14.48*** 321.76*** 119.56*** 807.92*** 358.01*** 964.58*** 726.33*** 
Test on weak instruments. 
Kleibergen-
Paap F test  373.04*** 255.53*** 268.40*** 82.36*** 589.95*** 231.98*** 943.38*** 521.09*** 
Weak instruments robust inference 
Anderson-R. 
Wald test 309.57*** 211.05*** 262.38*** 101.16*** 743.60*** 301.04*** 626.49*** 408.91*** 
Stock-Wright 
LM test 23.56*** 14.06*** 21.93*** 12.43*** 574.91*** 246.40*** 69.73*** 51.76*** 
Obs 18,407 5,097 15,489 12,632 49,163 10,771 52,243 39,208 
Notes: See Table 2. Robust instead of clustered standard errors are reported for upturn and boom in low-tech manufacturing 
(due to a singleton dummy variables problem the estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions were not of full rank in the 
clustered regression). In the downturn period for high-tech manufacturing CLIENT has been used as instrument instead of 
COOP in order to ensure instrument validity. CLIENT is a binary variable that equals 1 if clients have been a high-to-medium 
important information source for innovation.  
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Table 4: Impact of innovation on employment growth over the business cycle in knowledge-
intensive and less knowledge-intensive services 
 Knowledge-intensive services (KIS) Less knowledge-intensive services (LKIS) 
 
Upturn Boom Downturn Recession Upturn Boom Downturn Recession 
SGR_NEWPD 0.956*** 0.996*** 0.965*** 1.001*** 1.037*** 0.867*** 1.104*** 1.060*** 
 
(0.051) (0.086) (0.041) (0.037) (0.101) (0.093) (0.100) (0.084) 
PC -2.454 7.958 0.573 -1.992 0.774 -4.282 1.587 1.021 
 
(2.324) (7.408) (1.309) (1.471) (2.126) (3.685) (1.709) (1.085) 
ORGA -1.903 -4.599** -1.826** 2.642*** -2.283** 2.555 -1.358 -1.353** 
 
(1.320) (1.975) (0.916) (0.824) (0.956) (2.132) (1.487) (0.557) 
GDPGR 3.285*** -9.420** -0.334 0.902 1.297 -0.518 -0.668*** 0.932*** 
 
(1.197) (3.988) (0.387) (0.566) (2.827) (2.401) (0.258) (0.220) 
MEDIUM -6.298*** 2.204 -4.333*** -3.208*** -3.298*** -1.650 -2.784*** -4.903*** 
 
(1.272) (3.901) (1.049) (0.901) (1.207) (1.877) (0.800) (0.745) 
LARGE -6.778*** 0.687 -7.541*** -2.978* -2.034 -5.710** -4.228*** -6.929*** 
 
(2.152) (2.747) (1.990) (1.740) (1.921) (2.810) (1.080) (1.199) 
DGP -1.828 1.150 -1.135 -0.110 -0.347 -0.126 0.743 0.735 
 
(1.779) (1.790) (0.907) (1.172) (1.274) (2.575) (0.862) (0.694) 
FGP -4.632** 0.490 0.987 0.032 -5.287*** -3.215 -0.371 0.336 
 
(2.278) (2.707) (1.332) (1.383) (1.676) (3.304) (1.071) (1.187) 
Constant -53.700*** 59.986* -14.326** 16.192*** -25.715 -6.706 -5.479 15.024*** 
 
(16.929) (32.270) (5.708) (3.266) (34.288) (20.136) (4.384) (1.488) 
Wald test on joint significance 
Industry 0.189 0.515 0.007*** 0.307 0.311 0.247 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Country 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Time 0.004*** - 0.334 - 0.086* - 0.605 - 
R2a 0.294 0.412 0.338 0.438 0.185 0.306 0.233 0.295 
RMSE 37.127 36.549 36.452 24.652 37.175 29.477 34.363 22.823 
Wald-Test: β=1 0.387 0.962 0.392 0.984 0.712 0.154 0.297 0.477 
Tests on Exogeneity (p-value) 
SGR_NEWPD 0.001*** 0.451 0.000*** 0.072* 0.056* 0.805 0.023** 0.038** 
Tests on Instrument validity (p-value) 
Sargan/ 
Hansen J 0.656 0.230 0.898 0.236 0.256 0.675 0.477 0.574 
First stage results 
RD 24.178*** 23.038*** 19.424*** 18.534*** 17.234*** 25.871*** 15.298*** 14.995*** 
 
(2.523) (4.364) (1.450) (1.476) (2.950) (2.332) (2.499) (2.584) 
COOP 15.728*** 14.493*** 22.414*** 12.227*** 14.610*** 4.468 13.262*** 10.948*** 
 
(1.048) (3.543) (1.458) (1.111) (1.630) (3.195) (1.412) (1.500) 
F test on 
excluded instr. 218.94*** 70.60*** 241.48*** 221.65*** 58.79*** 83.54*** 53.48*** 41.66*** 
Partial R2 0.1410 0.0974 0.1722 0.1545 0.0796 0.2572 0.0489 0.0605 
Tests on underidentification 
Kleibergen-
Paap LM test 209.90*** 7.25** 732.28*** 261.28*** 106.59*** 115.68*** 178.35*** 87.23*** 
Test on weak instruments. 
Kleibergen-
Paap F test  228.92*** 81.59*** 548.30*** 177.58*** 102.16*** 83.55*** 66.12*** 60.08*** 
Partial R2         
Weak instruments robust inference 
Anderson-R. 
Wald test 183.94*** 74.30*** 343.78*** 268.62*** 162.47*** 54.02*** 122.43*** 250.14*** 
Stock-Wright 
LM test 29.79*** 7.72** 49.27*** 34.16*** 14.08*** 48.39*** 16.77*** 21.08*** 
Obs 20,518 4,226 20,424 21,157 24,833 3,741 32,738 26,121 
Notes: See Table 2. For knowledge-intensive services, CLIENT has been used as instrument instead of COOP in the downturn 
period in order to ensure instrument validity For the same reason RANGE has been used as instrument instead of RD in the 
boom period for less knowledge-intensive services.  
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The analysis reveals stronger displacement effects for organisational innovation (ORGA). ORGA has a 
significantly negative effect on employment in both high-tech and low-tech manufacturing firms. 
Employment growth decreases by about 2.1% for organisational innovators in low-tech manufacturing in 
two years, and the effect is similarly strong for high-tech manufacturing firms (-1.4%). In high-tech 
manufacturing, organisational innovation is particularly employment-destructive in upturns phases. The 
results also show negative coefficients for ORGA in knowledge-intensive services and in less knowledge-
intensive services which are, however, not significant for the whole period.11 The reason is that the sign 
and magnitude of organisational innovation varies quite a lot over the business cycle in KIS and LKIS. 
Most striking is the finding that in the recession organisational innovations have been associated with 
labour displacement in less knowledge-intensive service firms whereas knowledge-intensive service firms 
which have reorganised their business processes in the recession period perform significantly better in 
terms of employment growth. The size of the coefficients suggests that organisational innovation has a 
higher employment-destroying potential in KIS than in LKIS, and in services than in manufacturing 
(when splitting the sample by business cycles). 
Note, in the model the constant is the average real productivity gain and thus change in labour input that 
is not related to any innovation activity (general productivity trend). As the estimation additionally 
includes industry dummies, time dummies, size dummies, country dummies and is estimated for different 
business cycles, the constant in the regression tables represent the employment effect of the reference 
group. For each regression, it refers to the group of small firms that are not part of an enterprise group 
that belongs to one specific industry and country observed at one specific period. That is, the constant can 
refer to different types of firms/countries, which makes the comparability across regressions more 
difficult. The decomposition analysis in the next section provides a comprehensible estimate of the 
contribution of the general productivity trend to employment growth.  
With respect to the control variables we find the expected results for firm size. Larger and medium-sized 
firms exhibit smaller employment growth than small firms with 10-49 employees in all sector groups. 
With respect to foreign ownership, however, no consistent pattern across sector groups emerges. 
6. Employment decomposition 
A decomposition analysis at the sector and industry level complements the quantitative analysis. This 
allows us to disentangle the employment effects of product, process and organisational innovations from 
                                                     
11  The effect of organisational innovation is significantly larger in low-tech manufacturing than in knowledge-intensive services (p-value: 
0.0312), whereas the difference is only marginally significant (p-value: 0.1163) between low-tech manufacturing and less knowledge-
intensive services.   
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effects originating from general demand and productivity trends (Harrison et al, 2014). Based on the 
regression results, we can rewrite employment growth for each firm as: 
(3)   
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The first term, 0αˆ , measures the contribution of the general productivity trend in the production of old 
products to employment growth. It accounts for all changes in efficiency and as a result in employment 
that are not attributable to the firms’ own innovations in period t to t-2. For instance, 0αˆ  may capture 
efficiency gains due improvements in management practices, sales of unprofitable business units, 
training, improvements in the human capital endowment, in industrial relations, or productivity effects 
from spillovers. Some of these sources, like training, may stimulate own innovation – an effect that is 
captured by the innovation variable. But, training may also lead to efficiency gains unrelated to any 
innovation activities. For instance, better trained employees may also be more able to use existing 
technologies (like IT) more efficiently than before the training – an effect that would be captured by 0αˆ . 
The general productivity trend is calculated in a way that it is industry-, country-, time-, size- and 
ownership-specific, since it captures not only the effect of the estimated constant but also of the 
corresponding dummy variables and changes of GDP growth. It is measured as the average effect across 
innovators and non-innovators.  
The second and the third terms capture the labour displacement effects of process innovations and 
organisational innovations. Note the first three terms will be summed up into one factor in figures below. 
In equation (3) ( ).I  denotes an indicator function. It takes on the value one if the condition in parentheses 
is true and zero otherwise. That is, ( )2 0I g >  refers to product innovators, while ( )21 0I g− >  refers to 
non-product innovators. This implies that the fourth component measures changes in employment growth 
that are caused by the real growth of the output of old products for firms that have not implemented 
product innovations. Recall, a demand increase of old products can be due to a change in consumers’ 
preferences, price reductions but also because of rivals’ product innovations (business stealing effect). In 
contrast to equation (1), we capture the cannibalisation effect by the term 5a, while 5b includes the gross 
contribution of product innovation, output growth due to new products. In sum the components 5a and 5b 
measure the net contribution of product innovation to employment growth. The net contribution of 
product innovation to employment growth effect depends on (i) the demand increase for new products 
2 ,g  (ii) the relative production efficiency between old and new products, βˆ  and (iii) possible shifts in 
demand for the old products, ( )1 1g p−  . The latter effect captures cannibalisation effects if ( )1 1 0g p− <  
and complementarity effects to the innovator’s own old products if ( )1 1 0g p− > , respectively. 
21 
  
Averaging equation (3) across all firms in a sector provides the decomposition of the average employment 
growth at the sector level. We obtain the decomposition by inserting into the equation the estimated 
coefficients 0, 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,α α α  and βˆ , the weighted sector shares of non-innovators, process, organisational and 
product innovators and weighted sector averages for employment, price and sales growth rates (either for 
the total firms in a sector or for the corresponding group of firms). A corresponding approach is used for 
the industry level. 
7. Decomposition at Sectoral Level 
Figure 2 below illustrates the results of the decomposition for the four sectors over the period 1998-2010. 
For ease of representation, we have summarised the employment effects due to general productivity 
gains, process and organisational innovation, i.e. the terms (1) to (3), into one bar. A detailed 
decomposition is given in Table 5. The other three bars show  
• the employment effects from old products for non-product innovators, which include business 
stealing between product innovators and non-product innovators, 
• the gross effect of product innovation which includes employment growth due to products the 
firm has introduced to the market in the current period, 
• employment effects from old products for product innovators, which include intra-firm 
complementarity and cannibalisation effects between new and old products but also inter-firm 
business stealing between innovative firms. 
The sum of the latter two effects is the net effect of product innovation. All four components sum up to 
the (weighted) average two-year employment growth, which is depicted below by the horizontal axis. The 
size of the bars reflects the contribution of each component to employment growth in percentage points.  
The decomposition analysis shows that in high-tech manufacturing, firms have experienced sizeable 
efficiency gains in the production of existing technologies which would have led to a decline in 
employment by about 2.3 percent. These losses have been compensated by an increase in demand for old 
products by 2.9 percent. The most important driver for employment, however, has been product 
innovation. Employment growth due to sales generated with new products has been 15.7 percent. Even 
taking cannibalisation effects between new and old products and inter-firm business stealing between 
innovative firms into account (-12.5 percent), the net contribution of product innovation has been positive 
(3.2 percent) and even larger than for old products. It turns out that the displacement and compensation 
effects of product innovation and also its net effect are roughly twice as large in high-tech manufacturing 
compared to low-tech manufacturing. The same pattern of increasing displacement and compensation 
effects with increasing sectoral technological intensity is observed in services, which is in favour of our 
hypothesis H1. We also observe that displacement and compensation effects of product innovations are 
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higher in high-tech manufacturing than in knowledge-intensive services and higher in low-tech 
manufacturing than in less knowledge-intensive services which supports our hypothesis H2. Note, 
however, that the net effect of product innovation is very similar in HIGH and KIS on the one hand and 
LOW and LKIS on the other hand.  
Figure 2 : Decomposition of employment growth by sector groups 
 
Notes: Decomposition of the weighted average two-year employment growth rate across all firms in a given sector.  
Source: CIS3, CIS4, CIS2006, CIS2008 and CIS2010, Eurostat; own calculation. 
Table 5 furthermore show that displacement effects due to organisational innovation are stronger in 
manufacturing than in services. In services displacement effects due to organisational innovation are 
stronger KIS than in LKIS whereas we do not observe larger differences by sectoral technology intensity 
in manufacturing. Displacement effects of process innovation are small in all four sector groups. 
Figure 3 and Table 5 additionally show to what extent these employment contributions at the sector level 
differ over the business cycle. In upturns, product innovation is again the biggest driver of employment 
growth in all sectors – except for less knowledge-intensive services – followed by the contribution of 
demand for old products for non-innovators. The positive compensation effect of product innovation is 
larger in sectors with higher technological intensity. But in line with H1 we also see that negative 
externalities for product innovators are highest in high-tech manufacturing, being almost twice the 
absolute size of total employment growth. In all four sectors, job losses due to process- and organisational 
innovation and general productivity increases as well as the losses innovators suffer from fewer sales with 
their old products can be compensated by employment growth originating from demand increases for old 
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products by non-innovators and by new demand related to product innovation. The patterns for 
manufacturing and services look similar, apart from the fact that average employment growth is higher in 
services. We can explain this by lower negative externalities from product innovation in services and a 
higher contribution of old products. The contribution of product innovation, in contrast, is lower in 
services. Both observations support H2. 
The general pattern of compensation and displacement effects observed during an upturn changes only 
little when we look at sectoral employment drivers during an economic boom, despite the fact that overall 
employment growth and the contribution of product innovation is higher during a boom. This reflects 
increases in income of demanding firms and consumers and positive expectations of future demand by 
innovating firms. The largest difference in the contribution of product innovation can be seen in 
knowledge-intensive services, reflecting more open markets for these services. The contribution of 
product innovation in KIS even excels that in high-tech manufacturing, which questions the notion of less 
economic applications for new technologies in services. Moreover, we see higher employment losses in 
KIS from organisational innovation and the general productivity trend. The latter may indicate that 
measures taken by firms during a recession or upturn to improve productivity have a certain time lag and 
unfold their full potential only in the next stage of the business cycle. Since we cannot follow individual 
firms over time with the data at hand, we leave this question for future research. 
The pattern of employment growth in an economic downturn resembles those in an upturn and boom. 
Firms in all four sectors can compensate the displacement effects due to general productivity increases, 
process and organisational innovation by the positive compensation effects of new products. The gap 
between these displacement and compensation effects is highest in high-tech manufacturing.  
Demand for existing old products relative to new products contributes more to overall average 
employment growth in service firms than in manufacturing firms, leading to a higher overall average 
employment growth in service firms. This is the biggest difference between manufacturing and services in 
our analysis. As stated in Section 2, service products are more often the result of user-producer interaction 
than standardised manufacturing products which may reduce the need to exchange old for new products. 
The higher degree of customisation, together with a slower pace of technological change in service 
sectors, may explain the larger contribution of old products. In less knowledge-intensive services, new 
products contribute less than old products in all three business cycle phases (upturn, boom and downturn). 
Knowledge-intensive services are more similar to manufacturing. Whereas the gross demand effect of 
new products is similar to the demand effect of old products in up- and downturns, the net employment 
contribution of new products turned out to be lower in this sector except for the boom period. 
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Figure 3 : Decomposition of employment growth by sector and business cycle 
Upturn 
 
Boom 
 
Downturn 
 
Recession 
 
Notes: Decomposition of the weighted average two-year employment growth rate across all firms in a given sector and 
business cycle phase. 
An interesting question is how innovative firms in these four sectors perform during a recession. Can the 
positive compensation effect of product innovation unfold despite stagnating or even decreasing incomes 
and poor prospects of future demand? Figure 3 reveals that the compensation effect of product innovation 
via sales of new products is remarkably stable in all four sectors during a recession. In high-tech 
manufacturing, for example, there is only a small difference in this value between the four stages of the 
business cycle. It is the displacement effect of product innovation which considerably amplifies in a 
recession, leading to employment losses in manufacturing and less growth in services. Negative 
externalities almost double in high-tech manufacturing and in knowledge-intensive services compared to 
the upturn or downturn stage. This increase is one major reason why employment goes down during a 
recession across all sectors. The second major reason for employment losses during a recession is the 
contribution of old products to employment growth, which turns negative in all four sectors. 
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Table 5: Decomposition of employment growth by sector group 
 
HIGH LOW KIS LKIS 
Whole Period 
    Employment growth 3.8 3.0 10.1 7.5 
General productivity trend in production of old products (1) -1.6 0.3 0.4 2.2 
Displacement effect of process innovations (2) -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Displacement effect of organisational innovation (3) -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 
Output growth due to old products (non-product innovator) (4) 2.9 2.0 6.2 4.2 
Net contribution of product innovation (5) 3.2 1.4 3.9 1.3 
    Demand reduction in old products (displacement effect) (5a) -12.5 -6.0 -6.6 -3.3 
    Demand increase in new products (gross effect) (5b) 15.7 7.4 10.5 4.6 
Upturn 
    Employment growth 5.5 6.0 14.1 12.0 
General productivity trend in production of old products (1) -2.7 -1.1 2.3 3.5 
Displacement effect of process innovations (2) -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 
Displacement effect of organisational innovation (3) -0.9 -0.6 -0.8 -0.7 
Output growth due to old products (non-product innovator) (4) 5.3 5.7 9.1 7.2 
Net contribution of product innovation (5) 4.1 2.2 3.7 1.9 
    Demand reduction in old products (displacement effect) (5a) -10.7 -4.6 -5.3 -2.9 
    Demand increase in new products (gross effect) (5b) 14.8 6.9 9.1 4.8 
Boom 
    Employment growth 9.7 7.7 15.0 9.8 
General productivity trend in production of old products (1) -5.9 -5.6 -7.0 -5.6 
Displacement effect of process innovations (2) 0.1 -0.1 0.7 -0.4 
Displacement effect of organisational innovation (3) -0.2 0.4 -2.5 1.0 
Output growth due to old products (non-product innovator) (4) 7.2 8.9 11.9 11.4 
Net contribution of product innovation (5) 8.5 4.1 11.9 3.3 
    Demand reduction in old products (displacement effect) (5a) -9.1 -5.5 -7.7 -2.9 
    Demand increase in new products (gross effect) (5b) 17.6 9.6 19.6 6.2 
Downturn 
    Employment growth 4.7 3.2 10.5 8.6 
General productivity trend in production of old products (1) -6.2 -2.0 -4.4 -1.5 
Displacement effect of process innovations (2) -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.2 
Displacement effect of organisational innovation (3) -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 
Output growth due to old products (non-product innovator) (4) 5.7 3.9 10.1 8.1 
Net contribution of product innovation (5) 5.5 1.9 5.3 2.2 
    Demand reduction in old products (displacement effect) (5a) -9.8 -6.0 -5.4 -3.6 
    Demand increase in new products (gross effect) (5b) 15.3 8.0 10.8 5.8 
Recession 
    Employment growth -3.9 -4.4 3.6 1.0 
General productivity trend in production of old products (1) 6.9 7.4 4.6 7.2 
Displacement effect of process innovations (2) 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 
Displacement effect of organisational innovation (3) 0.2 -0.2 1.0 -0.4 
Output growth due to old products (non-product innovator) (4) -6.6 -9.5 -2.2 -6.1 
Net contribution of product innovation (5) -4.4 -1.9 0.3 0.2 
    Demand reduction in old products (displacement effect) (5a) -20.2 -8.2 -8.7 -3.8 
    Demand increase in new products (gross effect) (5b) 15.9 6.3 8.9 4.0 
Notes: Decomposition of the weighted average two-year employment growth rate across all firms in a given sector (and business cycle phase). 
Altogether, the net effect of product innovation on employment (as the sum of the gross effect of product 
innovation and displacement effects from old products for innovators) is negative in the two 
manufacturing sectors during recessions; employment growth from product innovation is not able to 
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offset demand decreases in old products in manufacturing. However, since this net employment effect for 
product innovators is smaller than the employment losses due to decreases in demand for old products of 
non-product innovators, we can say that product innovation nevertheless has a stabilizing effect on 
employment in the recession. Product innovators in service industries, in contrast, are even able to create 
enough new employment to offset decreasing sales in old products and all productivity and substitution 
effects in the recession, leading to a small employment gain. These smaller losses may also be explained 
by a higher import and export penetration in manufacturing than in services, and the resulting higher 
exposure of manufacturing firms to export markets (OECD 2010); international trade was hit much harder 
than domestic economic activity in the global financial crisis which implies that export-intensive 
manufacturing firms lost more turnover than service firms. 
8. Decomposition at Industry Level 
To evaluate heterogeneity in the relationship between employment creation and destruction in more detail 
and gain more insight into the drivers of employment growth we repeat the regression and the 
decomposition analysis at industry level (Table 9 and 10 in the Annex). Figure 4 compares employment 
gains from new products (dark bars) with losses from old products for product innovators (light bars) by 
industry. The figure includes a bar for each industry in upturn, boom, downturn and recession. Industries 
are sorted by increasing variance of gains and losses. For comparison, we also added the results at 
sectoral level on the right side of the Figure. 
Hypothesis H1 stated that job creation but also job destruction from innovation increases with technology 
intensity. Figure 3 provides evidence that further supports this hypothesis. We find low-technology and 
less knowledge-intensive industries such as transport, wholesale, food or textile on the left side of the 
figure. This position indicates only low contributions of innovation to changes in employment, but also a 
low degree of creative destruction measured by employment losses in old products for innovators in these 
sectors. However, we should consider that overall employment growth in these industries is below 
average as well. High-tech industries and knowledge-intensive services such as telecommunications, 
electrical equipment and electronics, machinery or the chemical industry represent the other end of the 
distribution. Gains and losses from innovation are particularly strong in telecommunications. During 
economic boom periods, innovation drove employment growth in this sector by more than 30% in two 
years. However, telecommunications also exhibits the highest employment losses from innovation. 
Performing simple mean difference tests of compensation and displacement effects (across all four 
business cycles and industries), Table 6 shows that in high-tech industries both displacement and 
compensation effects are significantly higher than in low-tech industries. Similarly, both effects are 
higher in knowledge-intensive industries than in less knowledge-intensive industries. Furthermore, we 
find the net effect of product innovation to significantly increase with technology intensity. Altogether, 
the data support H1 that job creation and job destruction increases with technology intensity.  
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Figure 4: Compensation and displacement effects of product innovation by industry and business 
cycle 
 
Notes: For each industry, the four dark bars show the positive compensation effect of product innovation (5b) in the four 
business cycle phases (upturn, boom, downturn, recession). The light bars present the displacement effects of product innovation 
(5a) for each business cycle phase. Both compensation and displacement effects refer to product innovators. All figures are 
weighted.   
Hypothesis H2 stated that compensation and displacement effects are smaller in services than in 
manufacturing. Table 6 shows that displacement effects are indeed significantly smaller in service 
industries than in manufacturing (at the 10% level). However, we do not find compensation effects to be 
significantly different. The latter result is mainly driven by the telecommunication industry. Excluding 
this industry, we would find compensation effects to be significantly larger in manufacturing industries 
(p-value; 0.0136). Overall, the data only partly confirms H2. 
Furthermore, in Figure 4 a clear pattern of how the displacement and the compensation effect evolve 
through various stages of the business cycle appears. In 13 of the 16 industries, job creation from 
innovation – the compensation effect - is highest in the boom period. In 10 of the 16 industries the 
compensation effect is smallest during recessions. This result clearly points to the importance of the 
demand effect for employment growth. Recessions, in contrast, are the period with the largest job 
destruction from the displacement effect in 15 of the 16 industries. Job losses are usually smallest during 
upturns. This pattern is also visible in all four sectors. 
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Table 6: Mean difference test of displacement, compensation and net effects of product innovation across 
industries 
 Industries Mean t-stat p-value 
Displacement effects HIGH -11.425 -4.1955 0.0002*** 
 LOW -6.564   
Compensation effects HIGH 14.994 8.4168 0.0000*** 
 LOW 8.436   
Net effect HIGH 3.569 1.4072        0.0865* 
 LOW 1.871   
Displacement effects KIS -8.5667 -3.9544 0.0009*** 
 LKIS -3.325   
Compensation effects KIS 15.075 4.3509 0.0004*** 
 LKIS 5.150   
Net effect KIS 6.508 2.6736        0.0095* 
 LKIS 1.825   
Displacement effects Manufacturing -8.332 -1.6444        0.0547*   
 Services -6.470   
Compensation effects Manufacturing 10.821 -0.1550        0.5609 
 Services 11.105   
Net effect Manufacturing 2.489 -1.7173        0.9514 
 Services 4.635   
Notes: The mean was calculated as mean over all displacement and compensation effects across all industries and business 
cycles, respectively. HIGH industries comprise chemicals, machinery, electronics and vehicles, LOW all other manufacturing 
industries. KIS industries consist of telecommunication, banking and technical services; LKIS includes wholesale and transport. 
Reported are p-values of a one-sided mean difference tests with unequal variances. 
The evidence presented above shows how absolute job creation and job destruction change over the 
business cycle and between sectors. However, we cannot read from this figure in which stages of the 
business cycle innovation matters most for employment growth. Thus, we have calculated in Figure 5 the 
net effect of product innovation (gains from new products minus losses from old products for innovators) 
as a fraction of total employment growth for upturn, downturn and boom periods. Recession periods are 
left out for an easier illustration. This indicator measures the share of employment growth which can be 
attributed to product innovation. 
The figure reveals that the net effect of product innovation is most relevant in high-technology 
manufacturing industries where 80 to 120% of employment growth can be attributed to the net product 
innovation effect. In low-technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services, around half of the 
employment gains can be attributed to the net product innovation effect, while the other half is generated 
by higher sales from existing products. This is an indication that innovation is relevant for employment in 
all sectors of the economy – not just in high-tech manufacturing. However, the Figure also demonstrates 
that the net effect is larger in high-tech manufacturing than in KIS, and larger in low-tech manufacturing 
than in LKIS in all stages of the business cycle. We would consider a different ranking as a falsification 
of H2. 
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Figure 5: Net product innovation as a fraction of total employment growth at sectoral and industry 
level 
 
Notes: Based on decomposition analysis in Table 10 in the Appendix.  
At the industry level, equipment and electronics, the chemical industry, or machinery stand out. In these 
industries, the net effect of innovation has almost the same size as total employment growth, which 
indicates that employment gains from higher sales of old products are completely absorbed by the 
employment-dampening effects process innovation, organisational innovation and general productivity 
increases. At the other end of the distribution, wholesale, transport, metal products or food products are 
typical sectors where innovation plays only a minor role for employment growth. Those industries gain 
only around half of their employment growth from innovation. This may hamper employment growth, 
which is lower than in high-tech industries. However, the aforementioned sectors also reveal a lower 
employment volatility in terms of employment losses from lower sales of old products. 
In contrast to Figure 4, the timing of employment effects of innovation is less clear in Figure 5. The effect 
of innovation is strongest in boom periods (6 out of 16 industries) and the following downturn (8/16), and 
lowest in upturn periods. The high relevance of innovation in an economic downturn may be explained by 
lagged effects of the investments from the previous economic boom. In high-tech manufacturing and 
knowledge-intensive services product innovation is the main driver for employment growth in boom 
periods. In upturns and downturns, old products contribute the most to employment growth in these two 
industries. This finding is also confirmed by the data at industry level. 
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9. Conclusions  
This paper investigated employment creation and destruction from innovation. Results indicate that the 
employment-creating effect of new products and services promotes jobs growth in general. This positive 
effect, however, is not straightforward; employment gains are degraded by employment losses from 
innovation-related externalities, by employment losses from process and organisational innovation and by 
general productivity increases. Overall, there is a positive net contribution of innovation to employment 
growth.  
“Creative destruction” and structural change in terms of employment gains and losses intensifies with 
rising technology intensity of sectors and industries (H1). There is also a clear hierarchy between service 
and manufacturing industries across all stages of the business sector with respect to compensation and 
displacement effects, despite a considerable heterogeneity in both effects within manufacturing and 
services. High-tech manufacturing shows the strongest compensation and displacement effects, followed 
by knowledge-intensive services, low-tech manufacturing and less knowledge-intensive services. As a 
result, the hypothesis (H2) that compensation and displacement effects are smaller in services than in 
manufacturing is only partly confirmed, and the results point to a finer differentiation than the simple 
duality of manufacturing and service sectors. 
The analysis provides important insights for innovation and industrial policy. A first important finding 
relates to the sources of employment growth: regression analyses found only minor variations in the 
relationship between innovation output and employment growth across sectors and industries; one percent 
sales growth from new products transfers into roughly one percent of gross employment growth. Thus, 
the variation in employment growth across the sample is rather the result of sectoral and industry 
differences in the share of innovative firms or in additional sales from new products each firm creates.  
This result highlights the importance of both, supply side and demand side technology policy designs 
(Steinmüller 2010); on the one hand, policy should aim at raising the share of innovative firms in the 
economy, and keep it stable in downturns and recessions. Non-innovators are not able to compensate 
losses in sales of their existing products with innovations. Broad horizontal funding schemes such as tax 
credits for R&D and innovation are an instrument targeted to lower the threshold for non-innovative 
firms. However, as Hud and Hussinger (2015) show, public subsidies could not prevent firms from 
shifting funds from R&D to non-R&D areas in a recession.12  
On the other hand, policy can influence sales growth from new products and therefore influence the rate 
of diffusion of new technologies by demand-side measures. Examples are policies that spread information 
about new technologies; such policies aim at raising awareness about new technologies and may 
                                                     
12 However, their study focuses on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) only. 
31 
  
influence adoption decisions of potential customers of innovative firms. This instrument, however, is only 
suited for selected technologies where the state has an interest in (Edler and Georghiou 2007), or which 
yield potentially high social benefits such as environmental technologies (Mowery, Nelson and Martin 
2010). Hence, policy instruments at the demand side may be restricted to raising general awareness for 
innovation and increase the willingness to experiment. 
A potentially fruitful area for innovation may also be environmental technologies. A couple of studies 
recently point out that environmental innovation can be a driver for jobs growth (Licht and Peters 2013), 
and may even provide more new employment than other types of innovation (Gagliardi, Marin and 
Miriello 2016). These results may also shed a different light on the relationship between innovation, jobs 
growth and (environmental) regulation (Vona et al. 2015) by pointing to employment gains from 
regulation. 
The analysis also found a considerable heterogeneity in innovation-related employment gains and losses 
across sectors and industries. Should policy exploit this heterogeneity by focussing support measures on 
high-technology industries where the largest net employment gains from innovation appeared in the past? 
We do not see that the results support such a policy for two reasons. First, classifications such as high-
technology or low-technology hide a lot of intra-group heterogeneity (Clausen 2007; Srholec and 
Verspagen 2012). In addition, there are other factors than the sectoral classification that interact with 
employment growth such as firm size, location, country-specific regulation, etc. A focus on high-tech 
manufacturing or knowledge-intensive services would overlook technical learning and upgrading in low-
technology firms which – despite the label – can be highly innovative and lead to employment growth as 
well (Som 2012). The analysis indeed demonstrated that also low-technology and less knowledge-
intensive industries generate around half of their employment gains from innovation. Second, a focus on 
high-tech manufacturing or knowledge-intensive services has some trade-offs. The analysis also shows 
that larger employment gains are accompanied by larger losses from negative externalities such as 
business stealing at the industry level. A focus on high-tech would therefore also increase employment 
volatility and creative destruction. This may be a good thing from the perspective of industrial policy, 
because it means that employment is relocated from less productive to more productive activities, firms 
and sectors. However, from the employment policy perspective structural change incurs adjustment costs 
from temporal frictional unemployment. Against the background of our results, we see a more promising 
path to higher employment by increasing the share of innovators and making low-tech more high-tech 
than to solely focus on high-tech. 
The global financial crisis has brought manufacturing industries back into fashion of economic policy 
(European Commission 2012, 2014). Countries with large manufacturing sectors seemed to be less 
affected by the crisis than countries with high shares of service industries. Demands for a “re-
industrialisation” were made, setting a goal of 20% manufacturing share on GDP for Europe by 2020 
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(European Commission 2012). From the perspective of this paper, a link between service industries and 
poor labour market performance cannot be established. However, we have to point to some limitations of 
our analysis when we compare manufacturing and services. First, we do not account for spillovers 
between sectors. Input output-data provides evidence that manufacturing R&D incorporated in products is 
an important driver for productivity in other sectors (Hauknes and Knell 2009). However, this is also true 
for KIS. Second, the analysis does not account for firm entry and exit. Higher birth and death rates of 
firms in services sectors (OECD 2014) may bias average employment growth rates in service firms. In 
addition to these limitations, our analysis would have benefitted from more detailed employment 
information. CIS data only provide the number of employees in headcounts but no specific information 
on the actual hours worked or on more specific information on employment contracts like the duration. 
This clearly limits the analysis; in particular if sectors or industries differ in these dimension.    
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Table 7: Distribution of CIS sample by industry 
Industry Variable NACE 
Rev. 1.1 
NACE  
Rev. 2 
Observations 
N % 
Manufacturing 
     
Food / beverages / tobacco FOOD 15-16 10-12 29,144 14.28 
Textile / wearing apparel / leather TEXT 17-19 13-15 29,019 14.22 
Wood / paper / printing WOOD 20-21,  
22.2-22.3 
16-18 23,252 11.39 
Chemicals CHEM 24 20-21 10,879 5.33 
Rubber / plastics PLAS 25 22 11,145 5.46 
Non-metallic mineral products NONM 26 23 11,584 5.68 
Basic and fabricated metals BASM 27-28 24-25 28,447 13.94 
Machinery MACH 29, 33.3 28, 33 20,844 10.21 
Electrical engineering ELEC 30-32,  
33.2, 33.4-33.5 
26-27 15,124 7.41 
Vehicles VEHI 34-35 29-30 9,648 4.73 
Nec NEC 36, 33.1 31-32 15,027 7.36 
Total    204,113 100 
Services      
Wholesale WHOLE 51 46 54,298 34.42 
Transport/storage/post TRANS 60-63  
64.1 
49-53, 79 33,420 21.19 
Telecomm. / computer program. / 
information services 
TELE 64.3,  
72.1-72.4, 72.6 
61-63 15,684 9.94 
Banks / insurances BANK 65-67 64-66 12,588 7.98 
Technical services TECH 74.2-74.3, 73 71-72 15,974 10.13 
Consultancies CON 74.1, 74.4 69-70, 73 8,104 5.14 
Other business related services OBRS 74.5-74.8, 70.3 74, 78, 80-82 11,096 7.03 
Media MEDIA 22.1, 92.1-92.2 58-60 6,588 4.18 
Total    157,752 100 
Notes: Up to CIS2006 the industry classification was based on NACE Rev. 1.1 (NACE: Nomenclature générale des activités 
économiques dans les Communautés Européennes), since CIS2008 NACE Rev. 2 has been used as industry classification system. 
Source: CIS3, CIS4, CIS2006, CIS2008 and CIS2010, Eurostat; own calculation 
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Table 8: Classification of industries based on their technology intensity 
Sector Subsector Nace 2.0 Nace Rev. 1.1. Description 
 High-tech  21  24.4 Pharmaceutical products and preparations 
 
 
 
HIGH 
manuf. 26   30-32 Computer, electronic and optical products 
 30.3  35.3 Air and spacecraft and related machinery 
Medium- 20  24 exc. 24.4 Chemicals 
high-tech 25.4   Weapons and ammunition 
manuf. 27  31 Electrical equipment, electrical machinery 
 28 29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c., 
 29 34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
 30 excl. 
30.1/30.3 
35 excl. 
35.1/35.3 
Other transport equipment excluding ships and air and 
spacecraft and related machinery 
  32.5   medical and dental instruments and supplies 
 Medium- 18.2  Reproduction of recorded media 
 low-tech  19 23 Coke and refined petroleum products 
 manuf. 22-24 25-27 Rubber and plastic products, other non-metallic mineral 
products, basic metals 
  25, excl. 25.4 28 Fabricated metal products, excluding weapons and ammunition 
 
LOW 
 30.1 35.1 Building of ships and boats 
 33  Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
Low-tech 
manuf. 
10-17 15 to 21 Food products, beverages, tobacco products, textiles, wearing 
apparel, leather and related products, wood and of products of 
wood, paper and paper products 
  18, excl. 18.2 22 Printing and reproduction of recorded media excluding 
reproduction of recorded media 
  31 36 Furniture 
  32, excl. 32.5 37 Other manufacturing, excluding medical and dental 
instruments and supplies 
  50-51 61-62 Water transport, air transport 
 
 
 
 
KIS 
 58 to 63 64, 72.3, 72.4, 
92.1, 92.2 
Publishing activities, Motion picture, video and television 
programme production, sound recording and music publishing 
activities; Programming and broadcasting activities;, 
telecommunications; computer programming; consultancy and 
related activities; information service activities  
  64 to 66 65-67 Financial and insurance activities 
  69 to 75, 78, 
80 
72-74, excl. 
72.3, 72.4, 74.7 
Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices; 
management consultancy activities; architectural and 
engineering activities; technical testing and analysis; scientific 
research and development; advertising and market research, 
other professional, scientific and technical activities, veterinary 
activities, employment activities, security and investigation 
activities  
  46 51 Wholesale trade 
  49 60 Land transport and transport via pipelines 
  52 to 53 63 Warehousing and support activities for transportation, postal 
and courier activities 
LKIS     
     
  79  Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and related 
activities 
  81 74.7, 70.3 Services to buildings and landscape activities 
  82  Office administrative, office support and other business 
support activities 
Source: Eurostat (2016a,b). 
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Table 9: Impact of innovation on employment growth over the business cycle by industry 
  Food Text Wood Chem Plas Nonm Metal Mach Elec. Vehi Nec Whole Trans Tele Bank Tech 
Upturn SGR_NEWPD 1.03*** 0.97*** 1.03*** 1.09*** 1.10*** 0.81*** 1.05*** 1.02*** 1.08*** 0.92*** 1.00*** 1.11*** 1.01*** 0.91*** 1.18*** 0.91*** 
 PC -1.03 2.61 -3.09 -2.27 0.31 -2.06 0.65 -1.88 1.05 1.36 1.37 3.85** -1.95 -4.83 5.68* -10.80*** 
 ORGA -5.64*** -5.40*** -5.59*** -4.22** -3.83** -1.907 -1.99 -4.15** -2.89 -4.74*** -5.78*** -6.04*** 1.43 1.27 -1.39 -4.37 
 β=1 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.30 0.13 0.00*** 0.45 0.71 0.14 0.18 0.98 0.28 0.92 0.15 0.23 0.22 
 J  0.11 0.84 0.25 0.77 0.31 0.95 0.47 0.80 0.45 0.14 0.46 0.26 0.94 0.56 0.52 0.86 
 KP Wald F 144.1 115.2 155.1 148.0 91.9 56.4 96.3 118.6 152.1 85.3 95.8 89.4 47.9 101.8 10.9 183.0 
 Obs 9,125 11,706 7,591 3,574 3,347 3,908 8,501 5,833 5,604 3,635 4,690 15,257 10,632 4,452 4,085 4,952 
Boom SGR_NEWPD 0.90*** 1.16*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 1.06*** 1.00*** 0.98*** 0.96*** 0.93*** 1.07*** 0.89*** 0.49** 1.23*** 0.96*** 0.68* 1.05*** 
 PC 1.48 0.25 -3.85 -1.08 5.39* -0.15 0.33 5.22 -2.96 4.13 -1.93 -11.66** 2.79 1.95 -10.23 20.17** 
 ORGA 0.65 3.06 1.10 -2.75 -2.47 4.59 1.49 -1.05 2.71 -0.36 -2.75 4.10 2.09 -2.38 0.18 -4.93 
 β=1 0.30 0.15 0.62 0.61 0.53 0.98 0.73 0.62 0.48 0.39 0.14 0.02** 0.43 0.83 0.35 0.80 
 J  0.61 0.47 0.28 0.38 0.29 0.99 0.75 0.39 0.31 0.64 0.57 0.26 0.51 0.38 0.20 0.25 
 KP Wald F 51.1 57.0 33.33 66.2 44.64 18.1 50.4 57.0 97.7 94.0 43.5 23.6 8.12 10.4 2.5 16.3 
 Obs 1,988 1,940 1,761 1,045 915 892 2,180 1,434 1,645 942 1,119 2,404 1,630 906 1,023 1,387 
Down SGR_NEWPD 0.91*** 1.12*** 1.05*** 1.12*** 0.88*** 1.11*** 1.01*** 1.07*** 0.86*** 1.00*** 1.02*** 0.97*** 1.22*** 0.96*** 1.06*** 1.02*** 
turn PC -3.49* 0.09 -0.76 -0.87 -3.83 3.45 -2.16 2.50 -6.44* -4.81 -5.22** 0.04 2.90 -2.78 3.72 0.99 
 ORGA -1.23 -0.93 -4.38*** -2.41 -2.92 -3.90 -0.90 -0.70 0.65 1.26 -2.48 0.38 -2.99 3.14 -6.33** -3.07 
 β=1 0.08* 0.09* 0.42 0.31 0.10* 0.32 0.84 0.18 0.08* 0.99 0.74 0.44 0.33 0.48 0.68 0.77 
 J   0.92 0.69 0.61 0.57 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.92 0.33 0.78 0.59 0.15 0.79 0.16 0.20 
 KP Wald F 194.3 177.2 184.9 73.4 59.6 86.5 211.3 147.4 83.1 57.1 116.1 345.8 14.0 291.5 39.5 172.4 
 Obs 10,094 9,946 7,690 3,346 3,743 3,877 9,358 7,094 4,221 2,751 5,080 20,200 11,188 5,000 4,022 4,639 
Reces SGR_NEWPD 0.95*** 0.88*** 1.04*** 0.82*** 0.87*** 1.13*** 0.89*** 1.03*** 1.08*** 1.06*** 0.95*** 1.07*** 0.98*** 1.05*** 1.13*** 1.03*** 
sion PC -1.91 -0.78 0.06 -4.35* -7.03** -0.21 1.20 2.57 -0.20 4.78 -2.77 0.68 -0.07 0.36 3.95 -3.22 
 ORGA -1.52 -0.63 0.37 -0.14 1.80 -1.95 -1.47 1.55 -0.51 -5.06 0.51 -0.65 -1.97 3.05 -0.07 2.08 
 β=1 0.40 0.09* 0.45 0.06* 0.12 0.26 0.11 0.63 0.36 0.78 0.37 0.57 0.86 0.46 0.58 0.75 
 J   0.53 0.72 0.20 0.77 0.15 0.61 0.93 0.27 0.76 0.62 0.62 0.16 0.59 0.25 0.49 0.68 
 KP Wald F 92.5 102.4 147.3 17.7 32.0 31.9 74.8 43.9 62.5 26.2 134.1 41.1 13.1 60.3 43.4 69.9 
 Obs 7,667 5,344 5,783 2,740 3,021 2,817 7,966 6,181 3,503 2,224 3,947 15,482 9,260 5,170 3,285 4,789 
Notes: Additional regressors (not reported): dummies for size, foreign ownership, country, time. 
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Table 10: Decomposition of employment growth over the business cycle by industry 
    Food Text Wood Chem Pla Nonm Metal Mach Elec. Vehi Nec Whole Trans Tele Bank Tech 
Upturn Employment growth 7.2 3.8 5.9 5.7 6.7 6.2 7.1 5.3 5.8 4.7 6.3 11.4 12.8 13.4 13.3 16.0 
 General productivity trend (1) 0.6 1.1 -0.9 -0.6 -6.4 -3.2 -1.2 -2.7 -4.2 -2.3 -2.0 3.4 4.0 1.4 -5.5 7.1 
 Displacement effect of process innovations (2) -0.1 0.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.7 -1.1 
 Displacement effect of organisational innovation (3) -1.7 -1.2 -1.6 -1.8 -1.5 -0.6 -0.7 -1.7 -1.2 -1.9 -1.8 -2.1 0.4 0.6 -0.7 -2.0 
 Output growth of old products (for non-pd) (4) 6.3 2.6 6.5 3.3 8.4 8.2 6.3 5.7 5.3 5.5 5.7 7.2 7.1 4.9 12.1 8.8 
 Net contribution of product innovation (5) 2.2 1.1 2.3 5.1 6.2 2.2 2.6 4.1 5.8 3.3 4.2 2.4 1.5 6.8 6.8 3.1 
     Demand reduction in old products (5a) -3.2 -4.8 -4.6 -7.8 -5.7 -4.3 -4.7 -10.3 -13.0 -8.9 -6.3 -3.1 -2.5 -14.6 -2.9 -6.4 
     Demand increase in new products (5b) 5.3 6.0 7.0 12.8 11.8 6.5 7.3 14.4 18.7 12.2 10.5 5.5 3.9 21.4 9.7 9.6 
Boom Employment growth 7.3 4.8 6.3 8.6 8.3 5.7 10.0 9.8 9.4 12.4 9.5 9.8 11.1 25.2 8.2 11.5 
 General productivity trend (1) -1.4 -5.0 -5.8 -1.6 -8.6 -9.6 -6.6 -6.2 -6.3 -8.9 -5.6 -0.9 -11.2 -5.7 -5.0 -7.4 
 Displacement effect of process innovations (2) 0.2 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 -1.0 0.3 0.1 -1.0 2.0 
 Displacement effect of organisational innovation (3) 0.3 0.9 0.4 -1.4 -1.2 1.7 0.7 -0.6 1.3 -0.2 -1.0 1.7 0.9 -1.4 0.1 -2.8 
 Output growth of old products (for non-pd) (4) 4.9 5.2 9.2 5.1 9.8 10.7 11.8 7.1 6.7 12.6 9.8 8.7 16.4 10.6 7.8 10.3 
 Net contribution of product innovation (5) 3.5 3.7 3.2 6.6 7.7 2.9 4.1 9.1 7.9 8.4 6.4 1.3 4.8 21.5 6.3 9.5 
     Demand reduction in old products (5a) -4.3 -5.5 -4.8 -5.9 -7.3 -7.4 -4.5 -9.5 -10.6 -7.1 -9.1 -2.5 -3.4 -11.6 -5.0 -9.2 
      Demand increase in new products (5b) 7.8 9.2 8.0 12.5 15.0 10.3 8.5 18.6 18.5 15.5 15.5 3.8 8.2 33.1 11.3 18.7 
Down Employment growth 4.1 1.2 1.9 4.0 4.8 1.9 4.3 5.3 4.2 6.0 2.9 9.0 7.7 14.7 13.6 10.6 
turn General productivity trend (1) -0.9 -0.3 -3.5 -1.4 -1.5 1.0 -3.9 -7.2 -5.5 -8.2 -2.4 0.6 -4.1 -10.2 0.5 -5.3 
 Displacement effect of process innovations (2) -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.5 -0.3 0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.1 
 Displacement effect of organisational innovation (3) -0.3 -0.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.5 -0.7 0.1 -0.8 1.4 -2.7 -1.1 
 Output growth of old products (for non-pd) (4) 3.9 0.7 4.6 2.4 4.6 -0.7 6.4 7.2 5.7 8.4 3.8 6.8 9.4 14.1 8.5 11.3 
 Net contribution of product innovation (5) 1.8 1.0 2.1 4.2 3.0 2.1 2.3 5.3 4.2 5.7 2.7 1.5 2.7 9.6 6.9 5.7 
     Demand reduction in old products (5a) -5.0 -6.3 -4.8 -13.4 -8.8 -7.2 -5.4 -7.3 -10.6 -7.5 -9.0 -4.1 -3.2 -9.1 -2.8 -7.5 
      Demand increase in new products (5b) 6.9 7.2 6.9 17.6 11.8 9.3 7.7 12.5 14.8 13.2 11.7 5.7 6.0 18.7 9.7 13.2 
Reces Employment growth 0.0 -5.4 -5.2 -0.4 -3.7 -7.9 -6.5 -3.6 -4.4 -7.2 -4.7 0.1 1.7 7.1 3.4 3.4 
sion General productivity trend (1) 4.8 4.0 5.0 4.2 5.5 11.7 11.7 9.4 3.0 7.9 7.1 8.6 6.2 3.6 7.4 6.9 
 Displacement effect of process innovations (2) -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.9 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 -0.3 
 Displacement effect of organisational innovation (3) -0.4 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.6 -0.5 -0.5 0.6 -0.2 -1.8 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 1.5 0.0 0.9 
 Output growth of old products (for non-pd) (4) -3.5 -7.6 -9.7 -2.5 -5.9 -16.4 -14.4 -8.8 -5.3 -9.9 -9.3 -8.2 -4.4 -0.5 -3.5 -4.1 
 Net contribution of product innovation (5) -0.7 -1.6 -0.6 -1.6 -3.0 -2.7 -3.5 -4.9 -1.9 -3.8 -2.4 -0.1 0.4 2.5 -0.9 0.2 
     Demand reduction in old products (5a) -5.5 -7.3 -7.2 -15.2 -11.0 -9.2 -9.3 -19.2 -18.7 -17.8 -11.3 -5.0 -2.8 -17.8 -6.6 -9.3 
     Demand increase in new products (5b) 4.8 5.6 6.6 13.6 7.9 6.4 5.8 14.3 16.8 13.9 8.9 4.9 3.2 20.4 5.7 9.4 
Notes: Black and blue cells indicate the highest and lowest values separately for manufacturing and services, respectively.  
 
